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1 Introduction
In response to the economic wreckage brought about by the recent global nancial crisis,
a new policy paradigm has quickly emerged in which old fashioned government distortions
such as capital controls or other quantitative restrictions on credit ows are becoming part
of the standard policy toolkit (the so called macro-prudential policies). Faced with strong
capital inows, appreciating currencies, and progressively tighter constraints on domes-
tic monetary policy, many emerging countries have already adopted or tightened capital
controls (with Brazil a well known case in point). Echoing these concerns within the emerg-
ing market world, even the traditionally conservative IMF changed its orthodox views on
capital controls and is now actively advocating the use of such tools as part of the "macro-
prudential" toolkit.
On the wave of this seemingly unanimous policy consensus, a new strand of theoretical
literature has emerged contending that such measures can be justied on welfare grounds
because of second-best considerations with the typical rigor of the DSGE methodology (e.g.,
Bianchi and Mendoza, 2010; Bianchi, 2011; Jeanne and Korinek, 2011a and 2011b).1 2
In this novel theoretical framework, the scope for policy intervention arises because of
a pecuniary externality stemming from the presence of a key relative price in the collateral
constraint that private agents face. In this environment, prudential interventions may be
desirable because they make agents internalize the aggregate consequences of their deci-
sions, discourage nancial excesses, and reduce the probability of nancial crises, possibly
enhancing welfare. As Jeanne (2012) put it, this literature transposes to international
capital ows the closed-economy analysis of the macroprudential policies that aim to curb
the boom-bust cycle in credit and asset prices.
Using the same theoretical framework of this new literature on pecuniary externalities,
in this paper we show that a credible commitment to a price support policy (in our case
a promise to support the real exchange rate in crisis times) always welfare-dominates pru-
dential taxes on debt (i.e. prudential capital controls), as they can achieve the rst best
unconstrained allocation. In particular, the desirability of capital controls is conned to
the case in which they are the only policy tool available to the policymaker.
The paper also contributes methodologically to the literature on pecuniary externalities
by showing that Ramsey optimal policy should be the preferred approach to policy design
rather than the social planner approach typically used to study the normative implications
1See also Lorenzoni (2008). See Benigno et al. (2011, 2012) for more details on this new literature.
2The traditional rationale for introducing capital controls ranged from reducing the volume of capital
inows to limit pressure on the exchange rate to allowing for a more independent monetary policy stance
(Magud, Reinhart, and Rogo¤ 2011).
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of this class of models. In fact we show that the normative implications of the social planner
problem are in general sensitive to the specic denition of e¢ ciency adopted, an issue that
does not arise in the context of the Ramsey planner.
As the vehicle to convey our message, we adopt the same model economy as in the
inuential article by Bianchi (2011).3 This is a two-sector (tradables and nontradables)
small open, endowment model economy with an occasionally binding borrowing constraint.
Borrowing is limited by the value of current income generated from both the tradable and
nontradable sectors. In this class of models, a nancial crisis event (also labelled a Sudden
Stop in capital or credit ows), only occurs when the constraint binds. In this framework,
a capital control corresponds to a tax on international borrowing, while an exchange rate
intervention is a policy aimed at controlling the behavior of the relative price of nontradables
through a tax on either tradable or nontradable consumption.4
More specically in our framework there are three possible distortionary policy tools (a
tax on borrowing, a tax on nontradable consumption and a tax on tradable consumption).
We show that the debt tax is welfare-dominated by the other two tools: while with the debt
tax replicates the constrained-e¢ cient allocation, with either one of the two consumption
taxes it is possible to achieve the unconstrained rst-best allocation.
The optimality of prudential capital controls in this model environment derives from
a specic feature of the planner problem in the context of the endowment economy. In
the endowment economy, there is no need to engage in any policy intervention during crisis
times since the competitive allocation always coincides with the constrained social planners
one in those contingencies. The best that policy can do is then to minimize the probability
that a crisis occurs. As a result, it becomes optimal to impose a tax on debt ows during
tranquil times.
But this result hinges critically on limiting the set of policy tools available to the pol-
icymaker. As we show in the paper, a properly-designed consumption tax (on tradable
or nontradable consumption) can achieve higher welfare by promising to manage the real
exchange rate during crisis times with the aim of relaxing the borrowing constraint when
it binds in bad times. In fact, in the paper we nd that a commitment to a price support
policy during crisis times can undo the borrowing constraint completely and, as a result, it
supports an equilibrium in which agents behave as if they were in the unconstrained rst-
best allocation during normal times. The result is that crises cease to occur in equilibrium,
3Bianchi (2011) shows that this model successfully reproduces the business cycle and the crisis dynamics
properties of Argentine data, and he uses it to quantify the optimal tax rate on foreign currency debt of
one year maturity. Most of our results are analytical.
4The interpretation of the real exchange rate as the relative price of nontradables follows from Mendoza
(2002), Caballero and Lorenzoni (2008) and Bianchi (2011).
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and the optimal policy reduces to a commitment to intervene along an o¤-equilibrium path.
Importantly, as we shall see, the policy supporting such an equilibrium is time-consistent.
The promise to support the exchange rate, therefore, is a credible one.
From a methodological perspective, the approach usually followed in the literature on
pecuniary externalities is to compare the competitive allocation with a social planner alloca-
tion. In this comparison, the social planner is constrained by the same borrowing constraint
that private agents face, but internalizes the general equilibrium e¤ects of her/his borrowing
decisions on market prices. One then seeks a set of policy instruments and corresponding
rules which replicates the social planner outcome in a decentralized equilibrium. An al-
ternative approach, along the Ramsey-tradition of the modern optimal taxation theory,
endows the policymaker with a set of instruments and solves for the policy rules that max-
imize welfare conditional on agents behaving as if they were in the competitive equilibrium
allocation.
An important result of this paper is that, in this class of models with endogenous
borrowing constraints, the Ramsey optimal policy can achieve higher welfare than the
constrained-social planner problem. This is because with certain policy tools the Ramsey
planner can manipulate the relative market price that enters the borrowing constraint so
as to undo such constraint completely. This result points to a fragility in the social planner
approach which might unintentionally limit the set of policy choices. In contrast, a Ramsey
approach conditional on a given set of instruments naturally compares the relative strength
of alternative policy tools.
Moreover the normative implications of the social planner approach are sensitive to the
denitions of e¢ ciency adopted. To dene the planner problem in this class of models, one
needs to specify how the relative price that enter the collateral constraint is determined
in the social planner allocation. The literature has followed either of two alternatives
proposed by Kehoe and Levine (1993): one possibility (which they refer to as the "general
constrained-e¢ cient problem") is to impose as additional constraint in the planner problem
the competitive equilibrium pricing rule. A second possibility, which they refer to as the
"conditionally-e¢ cient problem", is to determine this relative market price by imposing as
a constraint in the planner problem the competitive equilibrium policy function for such
price.
In the paper, we compare the two alternative denitions of e¢ ciency commonly adopted
in the literature and show how the normative analysis of this class of models might not be
robust to such di¤erences. For the specic case of the endowment economy that we examine
here, these two alternative denitions give exactly the same results. More generally, how-
ever, we show that in the conditionally-e¢ cient problem the gap between competitive and
3
social planner allocations will be much smaller than in the constrained-e¢ cient problem.
This is because, in the former, the key market price that enters the collateral constraint co-
incides in the two allocations for any given state of the economy. From a policy perspective,
this implies that the scope for policy intervention (either when the constraint does not bind
or when it does, labeled the ex ante or ex post perspectives, respectively) will be reduced
in the conditionally-e¢ cient problem relative to the constrained-e¢ cient one. For instance,
in the case of a production version of our economy, we nd that changing the denition of
e¢ ciency changes completely the results of the normative analysis.
Other modeling approaches to capital controls have been proposed in the literature.
Costinot, Lorenzoni and Werning (2012) in particular study how capital controls might
a¤ect the inter-temporal terms of trade, while De Paoli and Lipinska (2012) focuses on
the intra-termporal terms of trade. These are complementary studies of the normative
properties of capital controls. Our approach is based on the pecuniary externality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and its
competitive equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the social planner allocation under alternative
denitions of e¢ ciency. Section 4 analyzes the implementation problem with capital con-
trols. Section 5 analyzes the implementation problem with exchange rate policy. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Model and Its Competitive Equilibrium
We consider a small open economy in which there is a continuum of households j 2 [0; 1]
that maximize the utility function
U j  E0
1X
t=0

tu (Cj)
	
; (1)
with Cj denoting the consumption basket for an individual j and  the subjective discount
factor. The period utility function is isoelastic:
u (Cj)  1
1   (Cj;t)
1  :
The consumption basket, Ct, is a CES aggregate of tradable and nontradable goods, where:5
Ct 
h
!
1

 
CTt
 1
 + (1  !) 1  CNt  1 i  1 : (2)
5We omit the subscript j to simplify notation, but it is understood that all choices are made at the
individual level.
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The parameter  is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between consumption of
tradable and nontradable goods, while ! is the relative weight of the two goods in the
utility function.
We normalize the price of tradable goods to 1 and denote the relative price of the
nontradable goods with PN . The aggregate price index is then given by
Pt =
h
! + (1  !)  PNt 1 i 11  :
Here, we note that there is a one-to-one link between the aggregate price index P and the
relative price PN .
Households maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, which is expressed in
units of tradable consumption, and a borrowing constraint. The asset menu includes only
a one-period bond denominated in units of tradable consumption.
Each household has two stochastic endowment streams of tradable and non-tradable
output, fY Tt g and fY Nt g. For simplicity, we assume that both fY Tt g and fY Nt g are Markov
processes with nite, strictly positive support. Therefore the current state of the economy
can be completely characterized by the triplet fBt; Y Tt ; Y Nt g. The budget constraint each
household faces thus is
CTt + P
N
t C
N
t +Bt+1 = Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t + (1 + r)Bt; (3)
where Bt+1 denotes the bond holding at the end of period t, and 1+r is a given world gross
interest rate with  (1 + r) < 1:
Access to international nancial markets is not only incomplete but also imperfect as
we assume that the amount that each individual can borrow internationally is limited by a
multiple of his current total income:
Bt+1 >  1  


Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t

: (4)
The key feature of this international borrowing constraint is that it captures currency
mismatches in the balance sheet of our small open economy model (see Krugman 1999
for a discussion). In fact borrowing in the model is denominated in units of tradable
consumption, while both the tradable and the nontradable endowment can be pledged as
collateral. Indeed, currency mismatches have been one of the main vulnerability of emerging
market economies in the numerous nancial crises in the 1990s and the 2000s and in the
ongoing European crisis.
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While imposed in an ad hoc fashion, as in the related literature on pecuniary exter-
nalities and prudential policies, this constraint can in principle be derived from explicit
microfoundations. For instance, one way to justify it is to refer to an environment in which
the borrower engages in fraud activities in the period in which the debt is contracted (see
Bianchi 2011 and Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) for a discussion).
We also assume that in our economy there is a lower bound which is strictly greater than
the natural debt limit, B, such that Bt > B, for all t.6 This lower bound guarantees that the
competitive equilibrium allocation without government intervention and the international
borrowing constraint (4) (i.e. the rst-best unconstrained allocation) is well dened. In
particular, it guarantees that this equilibrium has an ergodic distribution of debt with
nite support, and both tradable and nontradable consumption have a strictly positive
lower bound, while the nontradable price also has nite support with strictly positive lower
bound. Finally, in order to focus on non-trivial policies, we also assume that, given Y Tt and
Y Nt , when Bt = B, the competitive equilibrium allocation always violates the borrowing
constraint (4).7
Households maximize (1) subject to (3) and (4) by choosing CNt ; C
T
t and Bt+1. The
Lagrangian of this problem is
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
"
1
1 C
1 
j;t + t

Bt+1 +
1 


Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t

+
t
 
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t  Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt   CTt   PNt CNt
 #
with t and t denoting the multipliers on the borrowing constraint and the budget con-
straint, respectively. The rst order conditions of this problem are
CT : u
0(Ct)CCT = t; (5)
CN : u
0(Ct)CCN = tP
N
t ; (6)
Bt+1 : t = t +  (1 + r)Et

t+1

: (7)
Combining (5) and (6) to obtain
(1  !) 1  CNt   1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1

= PNt ; (8)
6The natural debt limit is dened as the level of debt where tradable consumption CTt equals zero. In
our model, this level equals (minus) the annuity value of the lowest value of the tradable endowment. If CT
and CN are strong substitutes, this constraint may bind; since the evidence is against strong substitutibility
between tradable and non tradable consumption, we can ignore this possibility.
7This restriction amounts to a lower bound on .
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the competitive equilibrium allocation of the economy can be characterized by the rst
order conditions (7) and (8) and the goods market equilibrium conditions.
The properties of the competitive equilibrium of this economy are well known (see for
instance Mendoza (2002) and Bianchi (2011)). However, it is important to note that, while
in this paper we shall focus on the normative properties of this model, from a positive
perspective, Bianchi (2011) shows that this very same model accounts reasonably well
for observed business cycles (including the high volatility of consumption and the strong
procyclicality of capital ows), as well as the incidence and severity of nancial crises, in
Argentina.
3 Social Planner Equilibrium
It is well known that in our model environment private decisions fail to internalize their
e¤ect on the equilibrium relative price that enters the borrowing constraint, and such price
in turn a¤ects the borrowing constraint, creating ine¢ cient amplication e¤ects.8 In these
economies, therefore, there is scope for policy intervention to improve upon the competitive
equilibrium allocation.
As in the related literature, in this paper, we focus on planning problems in which the
planner faces the same credit constraint as the private agents in the competitive equilibrium.
To dene this planners problem, one needs to specify how this relative price is determined
in the social planner equilibrium. To do so, we follow Kehoe and Levine (1993), who
consider two alternatives:9 one possibility (which they refer to as the "general constrained-
e¢ cient problem") is to determine the relative price by imposing as additional constraint
in the planner problem the competitive equilibrium pricing rule (in our case equation
(8)). A second possibility, which they refer to as the "conditionally-e¢ cient problem", is
to determine this relative market price by imposing as a constraint in the social planner
problem the competitive equilibrium policy function (in our case PNt = f
CE(Bt; Y
N
t ; Y
T
t )).
10
While in the specic case of our model there is no particular reason to prefer one de-
nition to the other, but in general this choice is very important for the results of the
normative analysis of these model environments.In fact, for the specic case of the endow-
8Such a mechanism operates also if an asset price enters the collateral constraint, such as the price of
a xed stock of land (e.g., Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2011a and 2011b). Suitably
modied, our analysis and results extend to these alternative environments.
9See also the discussion in Lorenzoni (2008).
10This policy function is obtained from the solution of the non-linear system of equilibrium conditions
that dene the competitive equilibrium of the model. A policy function is the non-linear equilibrium
relation between the endogenous variables of the model and its exogenous and endogenous state variables
(in our case, the triplet

Bt; Y
N
t ; Y
T
t
	
).
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ment economy that we examine here, as we shall see below, these two alternative denitions
of e¢ ciency do not a¤ect the results of the normative analysis. In general, however, in the
conditionally-e¢ cient problem the gap between competitive and social planner allocations
will be quantitatively smaller than in the constrained-e¢ cient problem. This is because, in
the former, the relative price that enters the collateral constraint (PNt in our case) coincides
in the two allocations for any given state of the economy. From a policy perspective, this
implies that the scope for policy intervention (either when the constraint does not bind or
when it does, labeled the ex ante or ex post perspectives, respectively) will be reduced in
the conditionally-e¢ cient problem relative to the constrained-e¢ cient one.
This coincidence under conditional e¢ ciency is particularly important when the borrow-
ing constraint is binding (i.e., in crisis periods, according to the denition of nancial crisis
adopted in the literature). In fact the coincidence implies that the amplication mecha-
nism induced by the constraint via its externality on the relative price in the competitive
equilibrium allocation is "e¢ cient" in the sense dened above. Under conditional e¢ ciency,
therefore, nancial crises might be "e¢ cient" events that distort the allocation only outside
crisis states. From a normative perspective, this implies that the only scope for policy
intervention arises before entering a crisis state, which biases the normative results of the
analysis.11
This issue is even more important for planning problems with collateral constraints
that depend on asset prices like in the case of Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) and Jeanne and
Korinek (2011b). Asset prices are forward looking variables and, technically, it is di¢ cult or
it might be not feasible to compute the "constrained e¢ cient" planning problem because it
becomes non-recursive in the natural set of state variables. By using conditional e¢ ciency,
the computational problem becomes tractable at the cost of possibly biasing the normative
results.
In related work, consistent with standard practice in the optimal taxation literature,
Benigno et al. (2009, 2011, 2012) and Lorenzoni (2008) use constrained-e¢ ciency. Bianchi
and Mendoza (2010) use conditional-e¢ ciency to study their production economy in which
the collateral constraint depend on an asset price. Interestingly, however, Bianchi (2011)
uses constrained e¢ ciency to set up the planner problem for the endowment version of his
economy and conditional e¢ ciency in the planner problem of the production version of his
economy.
11Indeed, actual policy makers pursue both crisis resolution and crisis prevention policies. In addition,
as Benigno et al (2012) show, in an environment in which the planner has scope for intervening both in
and out of crisis states, the economys behavior in normal times depends on its behavior in crisis times.
Therefore, restricting the normative analysis to environments in which the crisis is "e¢ cient" is not only
counterfactual but may also bias the results in favour of ex ante policies.
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As we noted already, in our simple model environment, the specic denition of e¢ ciency
adopted does not a¤ect the normative analysis. Nonetheless, for illustrative purposes, and
to help understand the peculiar nature of the results in the related literature, in the rest of
this section, we shall analyze the planner problem of our model under both denitions of
e¢ ciency.
3.1 The constrained-e¢ cient planning problem
We rst study the constrained e¢ cient social planner problem. The planner maximizes (1)
subject to the resource constraints, the international borrowing constraint from an aggregate
perspective and the competitive pricing rule as in (8). By combining the household budget
constraint with the equilibrium condition in the nontradables good market, we obtain the
current account equation of our small open economy:
CTt = Y
T
t  Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt: (9)
The nontradable goods market equilibrium condition implies that
CNt = Y
N
t : (10)
From the perspective of the planner, the international borrowing constraint can be expressed
as in (4), where the relative price is determined by the competitive rule (8).
The Lagrangian of the planner problem becomes
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
264
1
1  (Cj;t)
1  + SP1;t
 
Y Tt  Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt   CTt

+
+SP2;t
 
Y Nt   CNt

+ SPt
 
Bt+1 +
1 

"
Y Tt +

(1 !)(CTt )
!Y Nt
 1

Y N
#! 375 ;
where SP1;t ; 
SP
2;t and 
SP
t denote the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers. The planner
chooses the optimal path for CTt ; C
N
t and Bt+1; and the rst order conditions for its problem
are
CT : u
0(Ct)CCT = 
SP
1;t   SPt SPt ; (11)
CN : u
0(Ct)CCN = 
SP
2;t ; (12)
Bt+1 : 
SP
1;t = 
SP
t +  (1 + r)Et

SP1;t+1

: (13)
where SPt  1  @P
N
t
@CTt
Y Nt =
1 

1

(1 !)
!

(1 !)(CTt )
!
 1

 1  
Y Nt
 1
 :
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The key di¤erence between the planning allocation and the competitive equilibrium
follows from examining equations (11) and (5). From the planner perspective, there is an
additional marginal benet in consuming one more unit of tradable consumption, repre-
sented by the term SPt t, which captures the increase in the price of non-tradable derived
from the marginal increase of tradable consumption. This terms drives a gap between the
planner and the competitive allocation when the constraint does not bind but is expected
to bind in the future with positive probability.
When the constraint binds for both allocations (i.e. in crisis states), however, the
competitive equilibrium of the model is exactly the same as the social planner allocation
even under constrained e¢ ciency. This is because, in the special case of an endowment
economy, for any given state in which the constraints binds in both allocations, consumption
of tradables is the same across allocations, driven by the constraint itself. In the special case
of an endowment economy, therefore, even under constrained e¢ ciency, nancial crises are
"e¢ cient" events that can distort only the allocation outside crisis states. From a normative
perspective, this implies that the only scope for policy intervention is before entering a crisis
state, which can bias the normative conclusions of the analysis as we discussed above.
3.2 The conditionally-e¢ cient planning problem
In the conditionally e¢ cient planner problem, the planner maximizes (1) subject to the
resource constraints, the international borrowing constraint from an aggregate perspec-
tive and the pricing function PNt = f
CE(Bt; Y
N
t ; Y
T
t ): So we can rewrite the international
borrowing constraint as
Bt+1 >  1  


Y T + fCE(Bt; Y
N
t ; Y
T
t )Y
N

:
The Lagrangian of the planners problem becomes
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
"
1
1  (Cj;t)
1  + SP1;t
 
Y Tt  Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt   CTt

+
+SP2;t
 
Y Nt   CNt

+ SPt

Bt+1 +
1 


Y Tt + f
CE(Bt; Y
N
t ; Y
T
t )Y
N
t

:
#
The planner chooses the optimal path for CTt ; C
N
t and Bt+1; and the rst order conditions
for its problem are:
CT : u
0(Ct)CCT = 
SP
1;t ; (14)
CN : u
0(Ct)CCN = 
SP
2;t ; (15)
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Bt+1 : 
SP
1;t = 
SP
t +  (1 + r)Et

SP1;t+1

(16)
+
1  

Et

SPt+1f
CE
B (Bt+1; Y
N
t+1; Y
T
t+1)Y
N
t+1

:
The di¤erence between the constrained and the conditional e¢ cient problem emerges
once we compare the rst order conditions of the two problems. In the constrained e¢ cient
problem the planner takes into account the pecuniary externality through his choice of
tradable consumption (see (11)); in the conditional e¢ cient problem the planner internalizes
the externality via the choice of debt (see (16)). In fact we can rewrite the intertemporal
condition for Bt+1 as
u0(Ct)CCTt = 
SP
t +  (1 + r)Et[u
0(Ct+1)CCTt+1 ]
+
1  

Et

SPt+1f
CE
B (Bt+1; Y
N
t+1; Y
T
t+1)Y
N
t+1

:
which is similar to the intertemporal condition (13). With conditional e¢ ciency, in (16),
when the constraint does not bind (i.e., when SPt = 0 ), the marginal social benet from
reducing one unit of CTt depends on the covariance between the future multiplier 
SP
t+1 and
the sensitivity of the price function to changes in debt, fCEB (Bt+1; Y
N
t+1; Y
T
t+1): Intuitively, as
we decrease Bt+1 (we reduce debt) we increase future consumption of tradables and hence
the relative price of non-tradable, so that fCEB (Bt+1; Y
N
t+1; Y
T
t+1) < 0. At the same time,
the probability of entering the constrained region tomorrow increases with Bt+1, implying
a positive covariance between SPt+1 and f
CE
B (Bt+1; Y
N
t+1; Y
T
t+1):
Despite the formal di¤erences, in the context of our endowment economy, the two social
planner allocations deliver exactly the same allocation in terms of tradable consumption and
borrowing decisions, both in tranquil and crisis times. But this is generally not the case: for
instance, for more general economies, such as the production economy of Bianchi (2011),
Bianchi and Mendoza (2011) or Benigno et al (2012), the two social planner allocations
would di¤er.
To illustrate this point, Figures 1 and 2 show the policy functions for debt, tradable
consumption, and the relative price of nontradables for the endowment economy of Bianchi
(2011) as well as the production economy studied by Benigno et al (2012). The pictures plot
the policy functions of the competitive and social planner equilibria under both denitions
of e¢ ciency, with the two economies calibrated as in Bianchi (2011) and Benigno (2012),
respectively.
In the endowment case, the policy functions of the social planner allocation for tradable
consumption and debt under alternative denitions of e¢ ciency In the aftermath of the
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global nancial crisis, a new policy paradigm has emerged in which old-fashioned policies
such as capital controls and other government distortions have become part of the stan-
dard policy toolkit (the so-called macro-prudential policies). On the wave of this seemingly
unanimous policy consensus, a new strand of theoretical literature contends that capital
controls are welfare enhancing and can be justied rigorously because of second-best con-
siderations. Within the same theoretical framework adopted in this fast-growing literature,
we show that a credible commitment to support the exchange rate in crisis times always
welfare-dominates prudential capital controls as it can achieve the rst best unconstrained
allocation. In this benchmark economy, prudential capital controls are optimal only when
the set of policy tools is restricted so that they are the only policy instrument available,
both in the constrained and unconstrained region (Figure 1). The policy function of the
relative price of nontradables instead is di¤erent under constrained e¢ ciency in the non-
constrained region. Such a di¤erence in the policy function for PN , however, is irrelevant
in the endowment economy since prices do not a¤ect the real allocation when the constraint
is not binding.
In the constrained region, in the endowment economy, the price of nontradables falls
dramatically both in the competitive equilibrium and in the social planner allocation under
both denitions of e¢ ciency. This decline sets o¤ the "Fisherian deation" mechanism
emphasized in the pecuniary externality literature a decline in PN that reduces the value
of the nontradable endowment, tightening the borrowing constraint and reducing the con-
sumption of tradables, which in turn again reduces PN , and so on. As Figure (1) shows,
however, the collapse in PN is "e¢ cient" in this model since the policy functions in the
competitive and social planner allocation coincide in crisis times under both denitions of
e¢ ciency.
In the more general case of a production economy, the denition of e¢ ciency matters.12
As Figure 2 shows, the two social planner allocations di¤er signicantly. In particular, as
we noted above, the gap between the competitive allocation and the conditional e¢ cient
planner problem is much smaller than the gap between the constrained e¢ cient allocation
and the competitive equilibrium. The implications of these di¤erences are summarized in
Figure 3, which reports the ergodic distribution of debt for these three allocations. While
the constrained e¢ cient allocation has less debt than the competitive allocation (i.e., there is
underborrowing), with conditional e¢ ciency there is less borrowing than in the competitive
allocation (i.e., there is overborrowing): changing denition of e¢ ciency turns the results
of the normative analysis upside down.
12In the production economy of Benigno et al (2012) the planner can manipulate not only the marginal
rate of substitution between tradable and non tradable goods, but also their marginal rate of transformation.
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These di¤erences are reected also in the probability of a crisis and the welfare ranking
between allocations, which are completely reversed by changing the e¢ ciency denition.
With conditional e¢ ciency we have a higher probability of crisis than in the competitive
equilibrium, while with constrained e¢ ciency the probability is lower. By the same token,
with conditional e¢ ciency, the welfare gains of moving from the competitive equilibrium
to the social planner allocation are more than 1/100 of those with constrained e¢ ciency
(switching from 0.18 percent of permanent consumption to 0.004 percent).13
4 Capital Controls
We now study the implementation of the social planner allocations through a tax on newly-
issued debt. In what follows we will refer to it as a capital control consistent with the rest of
the literature. In the competitive equilibrium, the households budget constraint becomes
CTt + P
N
t C
N
t = Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t + Tt  Bt+1(1 + Bt ) + (1 + r)Bt; (17)
where Bt > (<)0 is a subsidy (or a tax) on debt issued at time t, and Tt is a lump sum
transfer or tax. In the competitive equilibrium the government budget constraint must also
hold:
Tt = 
B
t Bt+1: (18)
All other assumptions are the same as above. In particular, international nancial market
access is constrained by (4) as before. As in the case without government intervention, we
make the same assumption on the lower limit of debt B 6 Bt for all t:
The competitive equilibrium allocation is then characterized by
u0(Ct)CCT (1 + 
B) = t +  (1 + r)Et [u
0(Ct+1)CCT ] (19)
with
t

Bt+1 +
1  


Y T + PNt Y
N

= 0
(1  !) 1  CNt   1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1

= PNt
along with the goods market equilibrium condition.
We now analyze the extent to which it is possible to use
 
1 + Bt

to decentralize the
social planner equilibrium under the two alternative denitions of e¢ ciency discussed above.
13Welfare gains are generally small in the literature because nancial crises are rare events.
13
4.1 Constrained-e¢ ciency
Under constrained-e¢ ciency, we can rewrite the Euler equation for the planner problem as
u0(CSPt )C
SP
CTt
+ SPt 
SP
t = 
SP
t + (1 + r)Et[u
0(CSPt+1)C
SP
CTt+1
+ SPt+1
SP
t+1]: (20)
Recall that the Euler equation for the competitive equilibrium (19) is
(1 + Bt )u
0(Ct)CCTt = t + (1 + r)Et[u
0(Ct+1)CCTt+1 ]: (21)
The following proposition then holds:
Proposition 1. In an economy dened by (1), (3), and (4), with a tax on debt B as the
government policy instrument, there exists policy for B under which competitive equilibrium
allocation implements the social planner one Bianchi (2011).
Proof. Since the resource constraints and the credit constraints are identical in the compet-
itive equilibrium and the social planner problem, we are only concerned with the intertem-
poral Euler equations (20) and (21). In order for the competitive equilibrium allocation to
coincide with the social planner one, the government must set
Bt =

u0(CSPt )C
SP
CTt
 1  
SPt 
SP
t   (1 + r)Et[SPt+1SPt+1]

(22)
where the superscript SP denotes the values from the social planner problem. With this
state-contingent policy rule, the Euler equations are identical and hence the two allocation
coincide. As Bianchi (2011) notes, when t = 0 and Et

SPt+1
SP
t+1

> 0, so that the credit
constraint is not currently binding but in the next period it will bind with positive proba-
bility, B is negative (i.e., is a tax). On the other hand, when the constraint binds, setting
Bt = 0 implements the constrained e¢ cient allocation since the borrowing of the planner
and the private agents coincide. Q.E.D.
So the tax on debt (or capital control) is precautionary in the sense that by taxing debt
today the planner can lower the probability of a crisis tomorrow. The tax is zero for levels
of debt at which the constraint binds in the current period. It is only when the constraint
does not bind today but will bind tomorrow with a positive probability that the tax does
take negative values.
The state contingent tax policy rule that implements the constrained e¢ cient allocation
also has other properties summarized by the following proposition:
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Proposition 2. The tax policy above is both Ramsey optimal and time-consistent. However
it does not achieve the rst best unconstrained allocation.
Proof. The tax policy above, together with the household rst order conditions,replicates
the solution of the social planner problem with constrained-e¢ ciency, which is identical to a
Ramsey problem for this economy. The Ramsey planner maximizes (1) subject to (10), (4),
(17), (19), (18) and (8). The tax policy (22) along with the household rst order conditions
satisfy the Ramsey constraints and replicate the social planner equilibrium so that the tax
policy is Ramsey optimal. In addition, since the tax policy decentralizes the social planner
problem, which is a recursive problem that can be represented by value iteration and only
depends on the current state fBt; Y Tt ; Y Nt g, the equilibrium would be subgame perfect and
time-consistent.
To see that the social planner problem does not achieve the rst-best unconstrained
allocation, notice that, if the rst-best unconstrained allocation were achieved (t  0 for
all t), the FOCs of the social planner problem (14), (15), and (16) would be identical to
the FOCs of competitive equilibrium without the international borrowing constraint (4).
Therefore since (1 + r) < 1, Bt would eventually converge to the lower limit B where the
credit constraint (4) would be violated by assumption. Q.E.D.
4.2 Constrained-e¢ ciency
Since the social planner problem under conditional e¢ ciency delivers the same allocation
as under constrained e¢ ciency, it is immediate to show that under the former denition of
e¢ ciency the same policy function for Bt as in (22) would implement the social planner
equilibrium with the same properties.
5 Exchange Rate Policy
We now consider alternative policy instruments. In the context of our endowment economy
there are two alternative options: taxing tradable or nontradable consumption. As we shall
see, these policy tools have a direct interpretation in terms of exchange rate policy. Indeed,
they directly control the relative price of nontradable goods, which in the context of this
economy is a measure of the real exchange rate.
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5.1 Tax on nontradables consumption
Lets start by examining the nontradable consumption tax. When we introduce a tax on
nontradable consumption, (1 + Nt ), the constraint that each household faces becomes
CTt + P
N
t (1 + 
N
t )C
N
t = Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t + Tt  Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt; (23)
where Nt > (<) 0 is a tax (or a subsidy) on nontradable consumption and Tt > (<) 0 is a
government lump-sum transfer (or tax). As in the case of capital controls, we assume that
the government runs a balanced budget:
Tt = 
N
t P
N
t C
N
t : (24)
Thus, the competitive equilibrium is now characterized by the following conditions:
u0(Ct)CCT = t +  (1 + r)Et [u
0(Ct+1)CCT ] (25)
with
(1  !) 1  CNt   1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1

= PNt
 
1 + Nt

: (26)
t

Bt+1 +
1  


Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t

= 0: (27)
Note here that (26) directly links the relative price of nontradables to the tax on nontrad-
ables. It is also evident that in an economy in which the borrowing constraint does not
bind, this policy tool is neutral in the sense that it will not a¤ect the consumption allo-
cation but only the real exchange rate. In fact, the Euler equation and the goods market
equilibrium conditions are all that is needed to determine consumption of nontradables
and tradables. In our endowment economy, however, this tax is no longer neutral when the
constraint binds and can be used to a¤ect the collateral value, and hence also the allocation
of tradable consumption.
The following proposition establishes how the use of such a tax can assure that the
constraint is never binding in equilibrium in our economy (t  0 for all t) via its impact
on the relative price on non tradable.
Proposition 3. In an economy dened by (1), (4), (23) and (24)in which a tax on non-
tradable consumption Nt is the government policy instrument, there exists a policy for 
N
t
that decentralizes the rst-best unconstrained allocation and it is time-consistent.
Proof. For a given stochastic process of

Y Nt ; Y
T
t
	
and a given state Bt, let Buncont+1 be the
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policy function of next period debt and PN;uncont be the relative price in the current period
in the economy dened by (1) and (3) but without credit constraint (4). Dene P^Nt to be
the minimum price such that the credit constraint would be met if it existed,
P^Nt = max
(
0; B
uncon
t+1 +
1 

Y Tt
1 

Y Nt
)
:
In the economy with credit constraint, the Ramsey planner maximizes (1) subject to (10),
(4), (26), (23), (24) and (25) and can set N such that P^Nt (1 + 
N
t )  PN;uncont so that
the credit constraint does not bind. In other words, let ^Nt = P
N;uncon
t =P^
N
t   1. Then
any Nt 2 ( 1; ^Nt ] is the tax rate which eliminates the credit constraint. Under this
tax policy, t = 0 for all t and the competitive equilibrium coincides with the rst best
unconstrained allocation. Moreover, this policy satises the rst order conditions of the
competitive equilibrium allocation. Since the Ramsey planner can achieve at best the
unconstrained allocation, this tax policy is the optimal solution to the Ramsey problem in
which the government chooses optimally the non-tradables consumption tax. Such policy is
completely determined by the current state fBt; Y Tt ; Y Nt g and therefore it is time-consistent.
Q.E.D.
The proposition establishes a tax policy that is able to replicate the unconstrained rst
best allocation: this policy promises to relaxes the borrowing constraint by supporting
the relative price of non tradeable whenever the constraint binds in such a way that the
constraint never binds in equilibrium. Under this policy, during tranquil times, private
agents behaves as if the constraint does not exist. In doing so their consumption of tradables
goods will be higher than in the competitive allocation and in the constrained social planner
allocation. For a given endowment of nontradable goods, this equilibrium entails a higher
relative price of nontradables during tranquil times, which in turn increases the borrowing
capacity of private agents, and makes the borrowing constraint never binding ex post.
Three remarks are in order here. First, the proposition above shows that exchange rate
policy dominates the precautionary capital control policy discussed in Section 4 in welfare
terms. In fact, under optimal policy with N the probability of a nancial crisis is zero and
the economy replicates the unconstrained rst-best allocation. In contrast, capital controls
can achieve only a second best allocation.
Second, the policy function for N is a promise to intervene o¤ the equilibrium path (i.e.
when the constraint bind, which never happens in equilibrium) and eliminates completely
the e¤ects of the pecuniary externality. More broadly, this type of policy can be interpreted
as a price support intervention that avoids the collapse of the relative prices (including asset
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prices) when a crisis does occur. But since the crisis state never occurs, the policy actually
is never enacted in equilibrium. Importantly, this policy commitment is a time consistent
equilibrium.
Third, the Ramsey allocation achieves higher welfare than the social planner allocation
dened in Section 3. This counter-intuitive result is due to the fact that the social planner
problem is constrained by the pricing rule as dened in (8). In contrast, the Ramsey
problem in which the policy tools is the tax on nontradables consumption is constrained
by (26). The Ramsey planner therefore can manipulate the relative price of non tradables
directly so as to undo the constraint completely without creating further distortions.
From this result it follows that the normative prescriptions obtained by comparing
the social planner allocation with the competitive equilibrium are sensitive to the way in
which alternative policy tools a¤ect the specication of the pricing equation. In this sense,
it becomes evident that the normative analysis of this class of models suggests that a
better way to conduct the normative analysis is by the computation of the optimal Ramsey
problem conditional on the set of available instruments rather than the social planner
problem as usually done in the related literature. In fact in the Ramsey problem the
pricing equation is part of the set of relations describing the private sectors behavior.
5.2 Tax on tradables consumption
We now consider a tax on tradable consumption as the governments policy tool. Each
household now faces the following budget constraint:
(1 + Tt )C
T
t + P
T
t C
N
t = Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t + Tt  Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt: (28)
As before, the government budget constraint continues to be balanced:
Tt = 
T
t C
T
t : (29)
Thus, the competitive equilibrium is now characterized by the following conditions:
u0(Ct)CCTt
1 + Tt
= t +  (1 + r)Et
"
u0(Ct+1)CCTt+1
1 + Tt+1
#
: (30)
with
(1  !) 1  CNt   1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1

=
PNt
1 + Tt
: (31)
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t

Bt+1 +
1  


Y T + PNt Y
N

= 0: (32)
We note here that the tax on tradable consumption now a¤ects not only the intratem-
poral relative price (see (31)), but also the intertemporal allocation of resources (see (30)).
Despite this interaction, the next proposition shows that it is possible to nd a state con-
tingent tax policy that replicates the outcome of the optimal nontradable tax policy.
Proposition 4. In an economy dened by (1), (3), (28) and (29) with a tax on tradable
consumption Tt as the government instrument, there exists a policy for 
T
t that decentralizes
the rst-best unconstrained allocation and it is time-consistent.
Proof. Let the optimal non-tradable consumption tax be Nt . It is easy to see that in the
Ramsey problem, if we set 1
1+Tt
= 1+Nt , we achieve the rst best unconstrained allocation
and t  0. Since the tax on tradable consumption a¤ects also the intertemporal allocation
of resources (30) we need to show that the tax policy that replicates the unconstrained
rst best equilibrium is constant so that the intertemporal margin is not a¤ected. As in
the previous proposition, such policy is naturally time-consistent. By comparing Euler
equations in both social planner problem and competitive equilibrium, and using t  0, it
is su¢ cient to nd Tt so that
1
1 + Tt
=
Et
"
u0(CSPt+1)C
SP
CTt+1
1+Tt+1
#
Et[u0(CSPt+1)C
SP
CTt+1
]
; (33)
and the international borrowing constraint (4) is satised, in order for the competitive
equilibrium to achieve the unconstrained rst best allocation.
First we note that a constant tax policy will satisfy (33). Secondly, by inspection
of the rst-best unconstrained allocation, non-tradable price has a strictly positive lower
limit. Therefore there exists T such that the borrowing constraint (4) is always satised
for any T > T ). Thus, any constant tax policy of the form Tt  T > T ) is an
optimal policy such that the competitive equilibrium replicates the rst best unconstrained
allocation. Q.E.D.
6 Conclusions
In response to the recent global nancial crisis, a new policy paradigm has quickly emerged.
In this new paradigm, macro-prudential policies i.e., old fashioned government distortions
19
such as capital controls or other quantitative restrictions on credit ows have become part
of the standard policy toolkit arguably because they can prevent or mitigate nancial crises.
On the wave of this seemingly unanimous policy consensus, a new strand of theoretical
literature is contending that such measures can be rigorously justied on welfare grounds
(e.g. Bianchi, 2011; Bianchi and Mendoza 2010; Jeanne and Korinek 2011b). This literature
reaches this conclusion by comparing competitive equilibrium allocations with that of a
social planner.
In our work we compare the competitive equilibrium and social planner allocations stud-
ied in the literature with those characterized by the solution of a Ramsey optimal policy
problem. Our main result is that exchange rate policy always dominates capital controls in
welfare terms. This policy is time-consistent and delivers the rst best unconstrained allo-
cation. In contrast, prudential capital controls can at best achieve a second-best allocation
of resources in which the collateral constraint continues to limit borrowing and gives rise to
the occasional crisis. The reason for this result, which is in sharp contrast to the existing
literature, is that a Ramsey planner can deliver an allocation with higher welfare than the
constrained social planner in this class of models. This result follows from the fact that
the Ramsey planner in this environment can choose policies to directly manipulate the key
relative price that enters the borrowing constraint and, conditional on the available policy
tools, can relax the constraint by supporting this key market price.
We suggest here that future work on macroprudential policies should follow the modern
optimal taxation approach as in the Ramsey tradition. While a social planner problem can
lead one to identify the need for policy intervention, it is not informative on the relative
merit of alternative policy tools to do so. In contrast, working directly with the Ramsey
problem requires one to specify the set of policy instruments before the analysis, which
naturally induces one to consider policy instruments that lead to the best outcomes.
Moreover, we have shown that the specication of the constrained social planner problem
might be very sensitive to the denition of e¢ ciency adopted, possibly biasing the normative
analysis signicantly. For instance, in the case of a production economy, we show that
changing the denition of e¢ ciency changes completely the results of the normative analysis.
It follows that the normative analysis of this class of models should either justify carefully
the denition of e¢ ciency adopted, show robustness to the alternative, or more simply,
adopt the Ramsey approach which is fully transparent in terms of the constraints imposed
on the normative analysis.
20
References
[1] Benigno, G., H. Chen, C. Otrok, A. Rebucci, and E.R. Young (2009), Op-
timal Policy for Financial Stability,  unpublished manuscript, available at:
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~cmo3h/research/BCORY.pdf.
[2] Benigno, G., H. Chen, C. Otrok, A. Rebucci, and E. R. Young (2011), Revisiting
Overborrowing and Its Policy Implications,in L. Céspedes, R. Chang and D. Saravia
(Eds.), Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, Central Bank of Chile.
[3] Benigno, G., H. Chen, C. Otrok, A. Rebucci, and E.R. Young (2012), Financial Crises
and Macro-Prudential Policies,Journal of International Economics, forthcoming.
[4] Bianchi, J. (2011), Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle,
American Economic Review 101(7), pp. 3400-3426.
[5] Bianchi, J. and E.G. Mendoza (2010), Overborrowing, Financial Crises and Macro-
PrudentialTaxes,NBER Working Paper No. 16091, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
[6] Caballero R. and G. Lorenzoni (2009), "Persistent Appreciations and Overshooting:
A Normative Analysis", unpublished manuscript.
[7] Caballero, R.J. (2010), Sudden Financial Arrest,IMF Economic Review 58(1), pp.
6-36.
[8] Costinot. A., G. Lorenzoni and I. Werning (2012), A Theory of Capital Controls as
Dynamic Terms-of-Trade Manipulation, mimeo, MIT.
[9] De Paoli, B. and A. Lipinska (2012), Capital Controls: a normative analysis, mimeo,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
[10] Jeanne, O. (2012) Capital Flow Management, forthcoming in the AER papers and
Proceedings
[11] Jeanne, O. and A. Korinek (2011a), Excessive Volatility in Capital Flows: A Pigou-
vian Taxation Approach. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 100(2)
pp. 403-407.
[12] Jeanne, O. and A. Korinek (2011b), Managing Credit Booms and Busts: A Pigouvian
Taxation Approach,unpublished manuscript.
21
[13] Kehoe, T.J. and D. Levine (1993), Debt-Constrained Asset Markets,Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 60(4), pp. 865-888.
[14] Krugman, P. (1999), Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises,
International Tax and Public Finance 6(4), pp. 459-472.
[15] Lorenzoni, G. (2008), Ine¢ cient Credit Booms,Review of Economic Studies 75(3),
pp. 809-833.
[16] Magud, N.E., C.M. Reinhart, and K.S. Rogo¤ (2011), Capital Controls: Myth and
Reality A Portfolio Balance Approach,NBER Working Paper 16085, National Bu-
reau of Economic Research.
[17] Mendoza, E.G. (2002), Credit, Prices, and Crashes: Business Cycles with a Sudden
Stop,in Edwards, S. and J.A. Frankel (eds.), Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging
Markets, University of Chicago Press and National Bureau of Economic Research.
[18] Mendoza, E.G. (2010), Sudden Stops, Financial Crises and Leverage: A Fisherian
Deation of Tobins Q,American Economic Review 100(5), pp. 1941-1966.
22
Figure 1: Endowment Economy Decision Rules
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Figure 2: Production Economy Decision Rules
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Figure 3: Production Economy Ergodic Distribution of Debt
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